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Abstract 
Employing an experimental approach, this paper examines whether the efficiency of fishery 
management can be achieved under Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) regimes, when 
fishers can choose vessel sizes. In addition to the most common types of experiments for 
trading permits, we analyze the situation in which the subjects choose one from two vessel 
types: a large-scale or a small-scale. The fixed cost for the large-scale is higher than that for 
the small-scale, whereas the variable cost for the large-scale is lower. We find that the average 
trading price converges to the theoretical equilibrium price given numbers of both types of 
vessels. We also find that vessels are chosen rationally in the sense that, the greater is the 
average trading price minus the theoretical equilibrium price in the past periods, the less 
incentive subjects have to invest in large-scale vessels. Moreover, quota prices in the first 
period could influence not only the quota prices but also the numbers of both types of vessels 
in the ensuing periods, and initial allocation could affect the rational choice of vessels by 
subjects/fishers. 
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1. Introduction 
Marine resources have been seriously depleted in the past few decades, and some of them are 
in danger of exhaustion. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO, 2008), more than 70 percent of marine stocks assessed are fully exploited or 
overexploited as of 2006. 
In response to this problem, governments and communities have implemented policies and 
schemes for management of their fisheries. Like other environmental and resource problems, 
the introduction of market mechanisms, called Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), are 
considered effective to tackle this problem. Under this regime, the authority determines the 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and the initial allocation of fishing rights/quotas. Fishers are 
able to transact those fishing rights/quotas in the quota market. This regime has been 
introduced in several countries, such as New Zealand, Iceland, and Australia since the 1980s.1 
Under an ITQ regime, an inefficient fisher gains more from selling quotas that s/he holds to 
other efficient fishers than from harvesting by herself/himself. Thus, fishers do not compete 
with each other for catching more fish with higher speed. When an ITQ regime is established 
with TAC, it is considered that the efficiency of fishing activities and the proper resource 
management are achieved simultaneously. 
On the other hand, some defects of ITQs have been pointed out, both theoretically and 
empirically. Newell et al. (2005) found that quota prices could be unstable for the first several 
periods, in particular, after the introduction of an ITQ system in New Zealand. The possible 
reason is that it takes a long time for fishers to get used to quota trading systems and to find the 
equilibrium price. Another possible reason is speculation. Fishers may expect that they will be 
able to resell quotas later at a higher price.2 
Experimental approaches are particularly effective to extract the functions of market 
                                                 
1 For empirical case studies, see, for example, Clark et al. (1988), Eythorsson (2000), Gauvin et al. 
(1994), and Weinger (1998). 
2 There are other theoretical analyses on the defects of ITQs. Vestergaard (2005) demonstrated that the 
existence of sunk costs delays the achievement of the optimal fleet structure. Bergland and Pederson 
(2006) considered the case in which some fishers are risk averse, and proved that they buy fewer quotas 
than those who are risk neutral. Moreover, Anderson (1991) demonstrated that, to harvest a certain 
amount of fish when some fishers have market power in the quota market, total cost is not minimized. 
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mechanisms and the behavior of stakeholders on the markets of tradable permits. Many 
experimental studies have verified that possible flaws of tradable permits could take place in 
the real world, such as price instability, noncompliance behavior, and distortions due to market 
power. For example, emissions trading has been drawing much attention (see Cason et al. 
(2003), Cason and Gangadharan (2006), Gangadharan et al. (2005), Godby (1997), Godby 
(2000), Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore (1994), Murphy and Stranlund (2007)). 
The efficiency of ITQ regimes can also be analyzed by using experiments. For example, 
the possibility that quota prices are unstable has been clarified. Anderson (2004) and 
Anderson and Sutinen (2005) provided the basic experiments for ITQ schemes, and found that 
quota prices may be much higher than those in equilibrium in which efficiency is achieved. 
Anderson and Sutinen (2006) demonstrated that the introduction of initial lease periods 
mitigates the problem of instability of quota prices. In other words, the possibility that a quota 
price increases due to speculation becomes weaker. This is because fishers do not consider 
quotas as assets in the lease periods, and find the equilibrium price during those periods. 
Moreover, Anderson et al. (2008) examined the relationship between cost structures and the 
situations of quota markets. 
Little attention, however, has been given to changes in scales of vessels. In reality, many 
inefficient fishers keep engaging in fishing activities. In some cases, there are too many 
small-scale fishers, which implies that a situation of excess entry takes place. In other cases, 
sizes of existing vessels are too large, implying excess investment by each fisher. For example, 
Managi (2009) estimated the inefficiency in the Japanese fishing industry and indicated the 
possibilities of cost reductions. 
Because each fisher can choose the scale of her/his own fishing vessel, the introduction of 
an ITQ regime may make fishers change their vessel scales. As noted above, suppose we 
consider the case that an inefficient fisher gains more from selling quotas that s/he holds to 
other efficient fishers than from harvesting by herself/himself. Then, it is natural to consider 
that each fisher has less incentive to keep/buy an inefficient vessel when an ITQ regime exists 
than when there is no such regime. Thus, it is considered that the introduction of ITQs makes 
vessel scales more efficient. Arnason (1993) and Geen and Nayar (1988) evaluated the 
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introduction of ITQs in terms of the efficiency of vessel scales for the cases of Iceland and 
Australia, respectively. 
Using the experimental approach, this paper examines (a) whether or not vessel scales are 
rationally chosen; and (b) whether or not ITQ markets function well. The first of our findings 
is that the average trading price (ATP) converges to the theoretical equilibrium price (EQP) 
given numbers of both types of vessels, although it may take a long time. Second, each 
fisher/subject chooses the scale of vessel rationally in the sense that, the greater is the ATP 
minus the EQP in the past periods, the less likely it is that s/he chooses a large-scale vessel. 
This implies that, when the quota market cannot realize the efficient equilibrium price, it is 
likely that the combination of efficient vessel scales cannot be realized. Moreover, we find that 
the quota price in the initial period and the initial allocation of quotas could play important 
roles in realizing an efficient situation. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical background. 
Section 3 refers to the experimental design. Section 4 examines the results of basic 
experiments, in which quotas are allocated equally in the beginning. Section 5 refers to 
additional experiments in which quotas (initial allocation) are not allocated to fishers/subjects 
equally. Section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Theoretical Specification 
Consider a fishery with N  fishers. Each fisher engages in fishing with one vessel that is large- 
or small-scale (types L or S , respectively). Each fisher harvests fish stock of a single species. 
All vessels of a given type are identical. Moreover, in terms of fishing technique, all fishers are 
identical, which implies that their cost conditions are equal to each other if they have the same 
type of vessels. 
The cost structure of each type of vessel is: 
( ) ( ) iiiii FqcqC += , ,0,0 >′′>′ ii cc                                                                                 (1) 
where iq , ic , and iF  denote the amount of catch, the variable cost, and the fixed cost of type 
( )SLii ,= , respectively. It is assumed that SL FF > , and SL cc ′<′  for any given amount of 
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catch. Moreover, since we assume the existence of fixed costs and increasing marginal costs, 
there exists a unique amount of catch that minimizes the average cost ( AC ) for each type, 
( )SLiqi ,ˆ = . We assume that a large-scale vessel is more efficient than a small-scale fisher, in 
the sense that: 
( ) ( ) .ˆˆ,ˆˆ SLSSLL qqqACqAC ><                                                                                  (2) 
Figure 1 shows both types of cost structures.3 
The government sets TAC, denoted by Q , determines the initial allocation to each fisher, 
and introduces an ITQ program for the fishery. The amount of Q  and the initial allocation are 
constants for fishers. The demand curve for fish is downward sloping: 
( )QPp = , .0<′P                                                                                                              (3) 
Unless the government changes the TAC level, the price of fish does not change. 
We consider a two-step determination of the harvesting structure. In the first stage, given 
the initial allocation, each fisher chooses the type of vessel s/he uses, and quotas are transacted 
between fishers in the second stage. We do not consider the case in which a fisher chooses to 
quit fishing by selling all the quotas s/he holds. It is considered that both new entry and exit do 
not take place because of the initial costs for entry and the costs of switching to other 
industries. Thus, a seller sells only a part of the quotas s/he holds. Quotas are transacted in a 
perfectly competitive market, which also means that both types of fishers are price takers in 
the quota market. The notion of equilibrium is a Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium, and we 
consider the determination of the harvesting structure by backward induction. 
We assume that large-scale fishers are buyers of quotas, while small-scale fishers are 
sellers of them. In other words, the initial allocation is determined so that large-scale 
(small-scale) fishers buy (sell) quotas in the second stage.4 Moreover, we exclude the case in 
which a fisher does not use part of her/his quotas to manipulate the quota price. 
                                                 
3 In reality, larger vessels might be less efficient. However, the assumption that larger vessels are more 
efficient does not matter for our purpose. Both in theory and experiments, the opposite case can be 
analyzed in a similar way. 
4 The opposite case can be analyzed theoretically in a similar way and similar results are obtained. 
Moreover, experiments for both cases can easily be conducted. For the present focus, and for simplicity, 
we deal with the case described in the text. 
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In the second stage, each type of fisher determines the amount of catch, and, accordingly, 
the amount of quotas that s/he buys (or sells) so that her/his profit is maximized given the price 
of quotas. The profit function of fisher j  when her/his vessel type is i  is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ,,,,,,, SLiqqrqCqQp jjijiijiji =−⋅−−=π                                                  (4) 
where r  and jq  denote the price of quota and the initial allocation for fisher j , respectively. 
The first-order condition (FOC) is: 
( ) .0=−′− rcQp i                                                                                                                (5) 
Let TLq  (
T
Sq ) denote the amount of catch of each large-scale (small-scale) fisher in equilibrium. 
Then, the following conditions hold given the number of each type of fisher: 
( ) ( ),TSSTLL qcqc ′=′                                                                                                                  (6) 
.)( QqnNqn TSL
T
LL =⋅−+                                                                                             (7) 
Thus, the equilibrium outputs and the quota price can be represented as ( ) ),(, SLiQnq LTi =  
and ( )Qnr L , , respectively. It is noted that the amounts of catches are not influenced by the 
initial allocations as far as the numbers of both types of vessels are given. 
From (6) and the assumption that SL cc ′<′  for any given amount of catch, it is clear that the 
amount of catch of a large-scale fisher is greater than that of a small-scale fisher for any given 
quota price. This implies that, the greater is the number of large-scale fishers, the greater is the 
total demand for quotas.5 Since the TAC is fixed, the following remark is established.6 
 
Hypothesis 1: The equilibrium quota price is influenced by the numbers of both types of 
vessels. In particular, the larger is the number of large-scale vessels, the higher is the quota 
price in the second-stage equilibrium. 
 
Since 0<′′ic  is assumed, it is clear from (5) that 0<drdqi  holds. Thus, the larger is the 
                                                 
5 The greater is the number of large-scale fishers, the smaller is the number of small-scale fishers, since 
the total number, N , is fixed. 
6 See Appendix A for the continuous case. 
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number of large-scale vessels, the smaller is the amount of catch of each type of fisher. 
In the first stage, each fisher chooses her/his vessel type so that her/his profit is maximized. 
Although their profits depend on the numbers of both types of vessels and the TAC level, we 
simply represent them as ( ) ),( SLinLi =Π  because the total number of fishers and the TAC 
level are fixed. Then, when the following two conditions are satisfied, *Ln  and )(
**
LS nNn −=  
are equilibrium vessel numbers in the sense that no one has an incentive to change her/his own 
vessel type: 
( ) ( )** 1 LSLL nn Π<+Π ,   ( ) ( ).1 ** LLLS nn Π<−Π                                                                      (8) 
As shown in Anderson and Sutinen (2005) and Newell et al. (2005), however, quota prices 
are not necessarily determined based on (6) and (7). This means that the quota price in the 
second stage is uncertain at the starting point of the first period from the viewpoint of each 
fisher. In such a case, in the first stage, it is likely that each fisher chooses her/his own vessel 
type based on her/his expected quota price in the second stage ( r~ ). Let α  denote the factor 
that positively affects the expected quota price. For example, the quota prices in the past 
periods are likely to influence the expected quota price positively. Then, the expected quota 
price is given by: 
( )α,~ Lnr ,   0~ >∂∂ αr .                                                                                                       (9) 
In this case, in the first stage, fisher j  chooses a vessel to maximize her/his own expected 
profit ( ji,
~Π ), which can be written as: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) SLiqnrqnrnrqCnrqQpn jLiLLiiLiLji ,,,~,~,~,~~ , =−⋅−−=Π αααα . (10) 
It is assumed that large-scale (small-scale) fishers are buyers (sellers) of quotas. Therefore, 
from (5), the effects of a change in α  on the expected profits for any given numbers of both 
types of vessels are given by: 
( ) ( ) 0~~,0~~ ,, >−⋅∂∂−=Π<−⋅∂∂−=Π kSkSjLjL qqrddqqrdd αααα ,                                       (11) 
where j  and k  are indexes for fishers. Consequently, the following remark is established. 
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Hypothesis 2: As the expected quota price of fishers as compared with the theoretical 
equilibrium price (EQP) becomes higher, it is likely that the number of small-scale fishers 
becomes greater. 
 
 
3. Experimental Design: Basic Sessions 
3.1 Sessions 
We conduct eight basic sessions, in each of which 12 subjects trade quotas in a computerized 
double auction. The ages of subjects are under 30, and they were mainly undergraduate and 
vocational school students. They participated in one session only and were paid an average of 
$30, based on an exchange rate of 100 Japanese yen = 1 US dollar. In the beginning of each 
session, subjects read the instructions for about 10 minutes.7 In this experiment, each session 
includes 10 periods and each period is divided into two stages. 
At the beginning of each period, each subject is given an “initial allocation.” In the first 
stage, each subject chooses between a large (more efficient) and a small (less efficient) fishing 
vessel. In the second stage, each subject can adjust their quota holdings by buying or/and 
selling quotas in the double auction scheme. To familiarize subjects with the experiments, we 
ran two training periods before conducting paying periods. 
We use the technical terms specific to fisheries to describe the experimental design and 
results in this paper. However, terminology that is more neutral was used with the subjects. For 
example, we referred to a fish quota as a “coupon” and marginal cost as marginal “production 
cost.” After the experiment, subjects answered a questionnaire that was used to measure their 
risk preferences.8 We conducted the experiment using the University of Zurich’s Z-tree 
program (Fischbacher, 1999).9 
 
                                                 
7 The instruction manual is available upon request. 
8 See Appendix B for the details on the questionnaire. An analysis on risk attitude is not the main 
purpose of this paper. We, however, conduct this questionnaire to exclude risk factors. 
9 These sessions were conducted at the Yokohama National University in September 2009 and January 
2010. Each session lasted about one and a half hours. 
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3.2 Investment decision stage 
In the first stage, each subject chose a way of production between Type 1 (small-scale) and 
Type 2 (large-scale), which we call “investment” hereafter. The fixed cost of Type 1 was 
smaller than that of Type 2, whereas the marginal/variable cost of Type 1 was higher than that 
of Type 2 (see Figure 1). In this experiment, the fish price was fixed, and it was equal to 30. In 
other words, the revenue from selling one unit of fish was always 30. At the beginning of each 
period, each subject was given eight quotas/coupons as the initial allocation, which implies 
that TAC was 96. S/he was also given a sheet in which fixed costs and marginal costs of both 
types were written (see Table 1 for the cost structures). According to the cost structures of both 
types, five subjects would choose Type 1 and seven subjects would choose Type 2 in the most 
efficient situation, in which the total cost of producing 96 units is minimized. In each period, 
each subject could observe the investment result, which was the numbers of both types of 
vessels, on her/his own display from the end of the first stage through the second stage.10 
 
3.3 Quota trading stage 
In the second stage, each subject can adjust their quota holdings by buying or/and selling 
quotas/coupons in the double auction scheme. It is considered that a rational fisher maximizes 
her/his own profit. Similarly, in the controlled experiment, subjects buy/sell quotas to 
maximize their own profits, which are determined by (a) how many quotas s/he holds after 
trading; and (b) how many quotas s/he buys/sells. When the initially allocated amounts of 
quotas are equal to eight for all subjects, it is clear that Type 1 (Type 2) sells (buys) quotas in 
the second stage. In the present setting of cost structures of both types, if the most efficient 
situation was realized in the first stage, Type 1 would sell five or six quotas/coupons, Type 2 
would buy three or four quotas/coupons, the price of quota/coupon would be 11, and the profit 
for each subject would be equal to 74. 
A deal was made whenever a buyer (a seller) accepted the current bid (the current ask). 
After each trade, the current bid and ask were closed and the market opened for a new set of 
                                                 
10 Each subject could not identify who chooses which type of vessel. They could see only the numbers 
of vessels in the period. 
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bid and ask. The history of trading prices was displayed on the screen. The quota market was 
open for the entire period, each of which lasted three minutes. 
 
4. Results of Basic Sessions 
4.1 Theoretical equilibrium prices (EQPs) 
Since subjects were able to choose types of vessels in each period, the EQP depended on the 
combination of numbers of both types of vessels. The list of EQPs is shown in Table 2. Some 
of them are not integers, since there is more than one possible equilibrium price. 
 
4.2 Description of prices and numbers of vessels 
The summary of results is shown in Tables 3 and 4, and Figures 2 and 3. As noted in the 
previous section, the number of Type 1 (small-scale) is five and the number of Type 2 
(large-scale) is seven in the most efficient situation. In such a case, the EQP is equal to 11. 
According to Tables 3 and 4, it seems that the efficient situations were realized in most 
sessions and periods, on average. Moreover, Figure 2 shows that it is likely that the average 
trading price (ATP) converges to the EQP of the efficient situation through periods in most 
sessions. When observing the average of ATPs of all sessions for each period, this trend 
becomes clearer because the price converges to 11 (Figure 4). Even the average numbers of 
vessels seem to reinforce the realization of efficiency (Figure 5). 
Then, is it true that markets of ITQs work perfectly in realizing the efficient situation in 
terms of both quota prices and the vessel scales? We investigate the function of ITQs markets 
in detail in the following. 
 
4.3 Prices 
First, we examine whether or not subjects learn the quota market, and whether or not they are 
able to maximize their profits in the second stage in each period. In other words, we 
investigate whether or not the EQPs are realized given numbers of both types of vessels. 
We calculate EQPATP −  for each period in each session, and obtain the average of 
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EQPATP −  of all sessions for each period. The result is shown in Figure 6. It is clear that the 
difference fades away as time passes. We also use EQPATP  to confirm the convergence of 
ATP to EQP, as shown in Figure 7. 
 
Result 1: The average trading price (ATP) converges to the theoretical equilibrium price 
(EQP) given numbers of both types of vessels, although it may take a long time to converge. 
 
We turn to one more important trend of trading prices. The correlation between ATP and 
EQPATP −  of each period of all sessions was greater than 0.94, and that between ATP and 
EQPATP  was greater than 0.85. If the numbers of vessels are fixed through periods and 
sessions, this result may be trivial. However, it does not necessarily hold when the numbers of 
both types of vessels change through periods. For example, if the difference is negative 
(positive) when the number of large-scale (small-scale) fishers is relatively large, the 
correlation coefficient could be negative. Thus, we establish the following result. 
 
Result 2: The strong positive correlation is observed between ATP and EQPATP −  (or 
EQPATP ). 
 
4.4 Choice of vessels 
We now examine whether or not subjects chose vessels rationally. We estimate the following 
equation by both Probit and Logit models. 
( )
εβββ
ββββ
++++
+++−+= −−−
iii
itittti
riskriskrisk
riskofitTPVEPTPcInvest
432
1Pr
876
51,41211, .                                (12) 
 
tiInvest , : The choice of Type 2 (large-scale) of subject i in period t. 
( ) 1−− tEPTP : The average trading price (ATP) minus the theoretical equilibrium price 
(EQP) in period t–1. 
1−tTPV : The variance of “prices” in period t–1. 
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Profitt–1: The profit of subject i in period t–1. 
risk : risk preference where risk 1–4 are different types of risk preferences.11 These are 
values based on the pretest survey before the experiments and added on the model to 
control heterogeneous preferences on risks. 
 
As noted in the theoretical part, we consider that the quota prices in the past periods 
influence the choice of the vessel of each subject in the present period. Moreover, a variable 
should be chosen according to the theory to extract the rational behavior. Thus, we chose the 
average trading price (ATP) minus the theoretical equilibrium price (EQP) in the previous 
period. Other independent variables are ordinary considered to be candidates that influence the 
choice of vessel type. Hypothetically, the variance (the profit) in the previous period 
negatively (positively) affects the choice of a large-scale vessel. 
A summary of the results is shown in Table 5. According to these results, the difference 
between the ATP and the EQP in the previous period influenced the present choice of vessel 
type. This implies that expected prices of subjects depended on the quota prices in the past 
periods. The sign of the coefficient seems to be intuitive: the greater is the difference between 
the ATP and the EQP in the past, the less incentive subjects have to invest in large-scale 
vessels. We also verify that the simple correlation  between Y and each of the followings show 
positive relationships: (a) the average of these differences in all of the past periods; (b) the ATP 
in the previous period; and (c) the average of the ATPs in all of the past periods. Similar to the 
difference between the ATP and the EQP, the results are significant. 
Consequently, we conclude that the choices of vessels are rational in the following sense. 
 
Result 3: Vessels are chosen rationally, in the sense that, the greater is the average trading 
price (ATP) minus the theoretical equilibrium price (EQP) in the past periods, the less 
incentive subjects have to invest in large-scale vessels. 
 
                                                 
11 For the meaning of the coefficients of risk factors, see Appendix B. 
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4.5 The importance of quota prices in the first period 
If the expected prices of subjects are formed according to trading prices in the past periods, the 
price in the first period (or in the first few periods) may affect trading prices in the ensuing 
periods. To confirm whether this type of influence exists, we observe the relationship between 
the ATP in the first period and the average of ATPs from period two through the last period in 
each session. The result is shown in Figure 8. It is likely that the ATP in the first period 
positively influences the ATPs in the ensuing periods. 
This fact also indicates that the ATP in the first period is important for the numbers of both 
types of vessels determined in the ensuing periods. Figure 9 indicates that the ATP in the first 
period negatively influences the number of Type 2 (large-scale) vessels in the ensuing periods. 
 
 
Result 4: The ATP in the first period influences not only the ATPs but also the vessel scales in 
the ensuing periods. 
 
The upward bias of trading prices in the starting point of ITQ markets has also been 
pointed out in the literature (see Anderson (2004) and Anderson and Sutinen (2005, 2006)). 
Moreover, as noted in Result 2, a positive correlation was observed between ATPs and the 
difference between ATPs and EQPs. Thus, the trading prices in the starting point of an ITQ 
market are very important for the vessel scales to be determined efficiently. At least, it is likely 
that the deviation of trading prices from the EQP in the first period delays the vessel scales to 
become efficient. 
 
5. Initial Allocation: Results from Additional Sessions 
In our basic sessions, quotas were allocated equally in the beginning of each period. As noted 
in Section 2, under perfect competition, the amounts of catches are not influenced by the initial 
allocations as far as the numbers of both types of vessels are given. However, it does not mean 
that the initial allocations do not affect vessel scales. Irrespective of vessel types, the expected 
profit of a fisher for any given numbers of both types of vessels increases, when her/his initial 
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allocation increases. From (5) and (10), we obtain: 
0~
~
, >=Π r
qd
d
j
ji                                                                                                                    (13) 
We focus on fisher h  who chooses her/his own vessel type. Suppose that Ln
(  other fishers 
have chosen large-scale vessels, and )1( −− LnN (  fishers have chosen small-scale vessels. 
Then, a small increase in her/his initial allocation increases her/his expected profit in the case 
in which s/he chooses a large-scale vessel by ( )α,1~ +Lnr ( . On the other hand, a small increase 
in her/his initial allocation increases her/his expected profit in the case in which s/he chooses a 
small-scale vessel by ( )α,~ Lnr ( . From Hypothesis 1, it is clear that ( ) ( )αα ,~,1~ LL nrnr (( >+  
holds unless α  changes. Therefore, an increase in the initial allocation gives a fisher a 
stronger incentive to invest in a large-scale vessel. On the contrary, the smaller the initial 
allocation a fisher has, the more incentive s/he has to choose a small-scale vessel. 
To confirm whether the numbers of both types of vessels are influenced by the initial 
allocations, we conducted two more series of eight sessions, which means that, in total, we 
conducted 16 additional sessions.12 In these additional sessions, quotas were not allocated 
equally. We represent the first eight sessions as the A1 series, and the second eight sessions as 
the A2 series. In the A1 series, each of six subjects was given six quotas/coupons, and each of 
the other six subjects was given 10 quotas/coupons. On the other hand, in the A2 series, each 
of six subjects was given five quotas/coupons, and each of the other six subjects was given 11 
quotas/coupons. Other details were completely the same as in the basic sessions, including 
TAC that was equal to 96. 
First, Figure 10 indicates that the ATPs converge to the EQPs in both the A1 and A2 series, 
which implies that Result 1 holds. In the A1 series (A2 series), the correlation coefficient 
between ATP and EQPATP −  of each period of all sessions was greater than 0.99 (0.91), and 
that between ATP and EQPATP  was greater than 0.99 (0.76). These values indicate that 
Result 2 also holds. 
                                                 
12 These sessions were conducted at the Yokohama National University in February and March 2010. 
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When it comes to vessel choices (Result 3), in the A1 series, the effects of both quota 
prices in the past periods and the initial allocation are not statistically significant. On the other 
hand, in the A2 series, both variables influence the choice of vessel types significantly. Table 6 
shows the results of Probit and Logit regressions for the A2 series. In these regressions, we 
added one more independent variable, “allocation dummy (Al_dummy in Table 6)”, which is 
equal to one when a subject is given 11 coupons (initial allocation), and equal to zero when a 
subject is given five coupons. It is clear that this variable positively influences the incentive to 
choose a large-scale vessel. In other words, as shown in the theoretical analysis, the greater the 
initial allocation for a fisher, the greater incentive s/he has to invest in a large-scale vessel. 
On the influence of the quota price in the first period on the quota prices and vessel scales 
in the ensuing periods (Result 4), we observe no clear correlation in the A1 series. On the other 
hand, in the A2 series, the quota price in the first period influences the prices in the ensuing 
periods because the correlation coefficient is 0.77. In the case of the effect on investment in 
large-scale vessels, the correlation coefficient is moderate (being –0.29). 
By our combining the basic sessions with the additional two series of sessions, it is clear 
that fishers/subjects behaved rationally in the quota market: they learned the meaning of prices 
and transactions, and they sold or/and bought quotas so that their profits were maximized. 
Given the numbers of both types of vessels, this implies that the total cost of catching a certain 
amount of fish was minimized. 
Moreover, from the basic sessions and the A2 series, we conclude that the behavior of the 
fishers on the choice of vessel type were rational in the sense that, the greater the value of the 
ATP minus the EQP in the past periods, the less incentive subjects had to invest in large-scale 
vessels. 
On the choice of vessel type and the effect of the quota price of the first period on the 
ensuing periods, the results of the A1 series were different from the basic sessions and the A2 
series. The possible reason is as follows. 
In the A1 series, the ATP converges to not 11 but 13 (Figure 11), which is not the EQP in 
the most efficient situation. It is likely that the upward bias of the quota prices arose and 
lingered over periods. Consider the case in which subjects with six initially allocated quotas 
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chose Type 2 (large-scale) vessels and subjects with 10 initially allocated quotas chose Type 1 
(small-scale) vessels. Subjects with Type 2 vessels catches more fish than those with Type 1 
vessels. Thus, the amount of quota trading becomes large. On the other hand, in the case in 
which subjects with 10 initially allocated quotas chose Type 2 (large-scale) vessels and 
subjects with six initially allocated quotas chose Type 1 (small-scale) vessels, the amount of 
quota trading becomes small. This is because they do not need to make many deals to achieve 
the optimal catch for their own vessels. Then, depending on which case arises, the amounts of 
quota trading may vary drastically through periods. Thus, the quota prices easily become 
unstable and buyers are eager to obtain quotas or speculation takes place. Consequently, it may 
be that the behavior of the subjects is not rational. Table 7 indicates that the variances of 
trading prices of the first five periods in the A1 series were relatively large as compared with 
the basic and the A2 series. 
Contrary to the A1 series, the difference between a fisher with a larger initial allocation 
and a fisher with a smaller initial allocation is greater in the A2 series. Therefore, it is likely 
that the choices of vessel types by fishers are stable: the possibility that a fisher with a larger 
(smaller) initial allocation chooses a large-scale (small-scale) vessel is strong. In this case, 
drastic changes in the quota transactions through periods are less frequent. 
The fact that some results of the A1 series are not significant does not mean subjects do not 
behave rationally; rather it means that initial allocations could play an important role in 
realizing efficient harvesting structure and quota trading.13 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to examine (a) whether vessel scales are 
rationally chosen by using an experimental approach. Like other experimental studies on ITQs, 
we also examined (b) whether or not ITQ markets function well. 
We obtained important information from our experiment, and extract some interesting 
                                                 
13 Some previous studies support our finding. For example, Burtraw et al. (2001) found that initial 
allocation rules affect the cost effectiveness of emissions trading schemes. Tietenberg (2006) 
mentioned that initial allocations play an important role, not only on the fairness of the program but 
also on the cost effectiveness in practical implementation of emissions trading schemes. 
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results for fisheries management by using market mechanisms. First, the average trading price 
(ATP) converges to the theoretical equilibrium price (EQP) given numbers of both types of 
vessels, although it may take a long time to converge. In contrast to the results obtained in the 
literature, we verified that, even if vessel scales change through periods, subjects learn the 
market and the quota price converges to the EQP, on average. We also found that a strong 
positive correlation exists between the ATP and the variable, EQPATP −  (or EQPATP ). 
Second, we found that vessels are chosen rationally in the sense that, the greater is the ATP 
minus the EQP in the past periods, the less incentive subjects have to invest in large-scale 
vessels. Moreover, the ATP in the first period could influence not only the ATPs but also the 
vessel scales in the ensuing periods. 
Third, theoretically, the initial allocations do not matter in terms of efficiency, when the 
numbers of both large- and small-scale vessels are fixed, and when the quota market is 
perfectly competitive. We found, however, that it could influence the vessel scales 
significantly through two channels. The first channel is that increases in the initial allocations 
give fishers stronger incentive to invest in large-scale vessels. This effect arises because 
fishers are rational. The second channel is that the quota price may be unstable, and this 
situation influences the choice of vessel types by fishers. This effect may arise because fishers 
cannot carry out rational decision making. 
Finally, for fisheries management, to realize the efficient vessel scales is an important task. 
ITQ regimes could help vessel scales to become efficient. However, whether or not the EQP is 
realized in each period plays a key role, not only for short-run efficiency, but also for long-run 
efficiency, in which the total social cost to catch a certain amount of fish is minimized. 
There are other issues on the function of ITQ regimes. For example, uncertainty on fish 
prices and costs may also play an important role in determining the degree of efficiency under 
an ITQ regime. Moreover, exit from the fishing industry is also an important issue. To clarify 
the effects of those factors using laboratory experiments is a future task. 
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Appendix A: The number of both types of vessels and the quota price 
In this Appendix, we neglect integer problems on the numbers of vessels. 
Total differentiation of (6) and (7) with respect to Ln  yields: 
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Thus, we obtain: 
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where ( ) 0>′′+−⋅′′=Ω LSLL ncnNc . Note that these derivatives are negative. Thus, from (5), 
we obtain that: 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire 
In the questionnaire, there were four questions on risk attitude following other psychological 
surveys. 
 
1) What is the lowest probability of precipitation that you take an umbrella with you? 
2) If you have an appointment to meet your friends, how much time before the time of the 
appointment do you get to the meeting place? 
3) How often do you cross streets against the red light, when there is no traffic? 
4) Do you usually care about lockups and fire? To what extent? 
 
In Tables 5 and 6, “risk 1” through “risk 4” correspond to “question 1” through “question 4” 
above, respectively. For “risk 1” and “risk 4”, we process the data so that the risk lovers (risk 
averters) get higher (lower) rates. On the other hand, for “risk 2” and “risk 3”, we process the 
data so that the risk averters (risk lovers) get higher (lower) rates. 
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             Figure 1. Cost Structure  
  Type1: Small scale Type2: Large scale 
fishing amount Total cost Marginal cost Total cost Marginal cost 
0(fix cost) 20   80   
1 35 15 88 8 
2 52 17 97 9 
3 71 19 107 10 
4 92 21 118 11 
5 115 23 130 12 
6 140 25 143 13 
7 167 27 157 14 
8 196 29 172 15 
9 227 31 188 16 
10 260 33 205 17 
11 295 35 223 18 
12 332 37 242 19 
13 371 39 262 20 
14 412 41 283 21 
15 455 43 305 22 
16 500 45 328 23 
17 547 47 352 24 
18 596 49 377 25 
19 647 51 403 26 
20 700 53 430 27 
Table 1: Cost structures of both types of vessels 
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   Number of Vessels Theoretically Equilibrium 
Price (EQP) 
 Type1(S)=9,  Type2(L)=3         5.5 
Type1(S)=8,  Type2(L)=4         7 
 Type1(S)=7,  Type2(L)=5         9 
Type1(S)=6,  Type2(L)=6         9.5 
 Type1(S)=5,  Type2(L)=7        11 
 Type1(S)=4,  Type2(L)=8        11.5 
 Type1(S)=3,  Type2(L)=9        12.5 
 Type1(S)=2,  Type2(L)=10        13 
                  Table 2: Theoretical equilibrium price (EQP) 
 
Session Average Trading Price     (ATP) Variance of price Type 1 (S) 
Type 2 
(L) 
1 11.64 102.25 5.1 6.9 
2 10.34  18.04 4 8 
3  8.10  94.58 4.5 7.5 
4 11.58  40.22 5.4 6.6 
5 14.31 207.19 5.8 6.2 
6  9.20  56.86 4.3 7.7 
7 15.48 109.93 6.2 5.8 
8 15.62 1862.34 4.9 7.1 
Average 12.03 311.43 5.025 6.975 
Table 3: Average trading price (ATP), variance, and numbers of vessels of each session 
 
Period Average Trading Price    (ATP) Variance of price
Type 1 
(S) 
Type 2 
(L) 
1 12.94  88.33 4.75 7.25 
2 14.20 104.59 5 7 
3 13.53 263.17 4.875 7.125 
4 12.63  61.69 5.125 6.875 
5 11.79  81.72 5.125 6.875 
6 10.95  49.41 5.5 6.5 
7 10.99  69.11 5 7 
8 10.23  26.86 4.75 7.25 
9 12.29 2275.77 5.125 6.875 
10 10.79  93.60 5 7 
Average 12.03 311.43 5.025 6.975 
 Table 4: Average trading price (ATP), variance, and numbers of vessels of each period 
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             Figure 2: Price trend of each session 
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   Figure 3: The trend of numbers of Type 2 (Large-scale) vessels of each session 
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               Figure 4: The average of ATP in each period including all sessions 
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       Figure 5: The average of the numbers of vessels in each period including all sessions 
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    Figure 6: The average difference of ATP and EQP in each period 
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    Figure 7: The average ratio of ATP to EQP in each period 
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             Table 5: The effect of quota prices on the choice of vessel  
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Probit 
Variable Coef. z 
TP-EP -0.0239*   -1.91
TPV 0.00005**  2.03
Profit 0.0001    0.10
risk1 0.0038    0.44
risk2 0.0351*   1.90
risk3 0.6519*** 2.74
risk4 -0.0000    -0.00
cons -0.2860    0.01
Observations: 720. Dependent Variable: Choice of Type 2 (Large-scale). 
Note: *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5%level, ***Significant at 1% level by t-test. 
Logit 
Variable Coef. z 
TP-EP -0.0379* -1.88
TPV 0.0001*    1.95
Profit 0.0001     0.09
risk1 0.0060     0.43
risk2 0.0553*    1.86
risk3 1.0487***  2.72
risk4 -0.0005     -0.01
cons -0.4520     -1.10
 
ATP in Period 1 
The average ATP from 
Period 2 through 10 
ATP in Period 1 
The average number of Type 
2 from Period 2 through 10 
Figure 8: The affect of ATP in period 1 on ATPs in the ensuing periods. 
Figure 9: The effect of ATP in Period 1 on Type 2 vessels  
in the ensuing periods. 
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         Figure 10. The average ratio of ATP to EQP in each period in A1 and A2 series 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Table 6: The effect of quota prices and initial allocation on the choice of vessel  
in A2 series 
 
Probit 
Variable Coef. z 
TP-EP -0.0176*  -1.75
TPV -0.0000   0.01
Profit   0.0000   0.10
Al-dummy 0.5637*** 5.62
risk1 0.0022   0.26
risk2 -0.0164*  -1.96
risk3 -0.0828   -0.40
risk4 0.0233   0.47
cons 0.0174   0.07
Observations: 828. Dependent Variable: Choice of Type 2 (Large-scale). 
Note: *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5%level, ***Significant at 1% level by t-test. 
Logit 
Variable Coef. z 
TP-EP -0.0283*   -1.73
TPV -0.0000    -0.02
Profit   0.0004    0.05
Al-dummy 0.9115*** 5.57
risk1 0.0039    0.28
risk2 -0.0265**  -1.96
risk3 -0.1431    -0.43
risk4 0.0390    0.49
cons 0.0338    0.08
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            Figure 11: The average of ATPs in each period including all sessions  
in A1 series. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
               Table 7: Variances of Trading Prices 
 
 
Period Basic A1 A2 
1 88.33 15413.17 56.92
2 104.59 127.54 81.82
3 263.17 101.72 131.08
4 61.69 139.56 65.03
5 81.72 2378.94 131.23
6 49.41 38.24 46.27
7 69.11 83.83 404.18
8 26.86 32.12 60.42
9 2275.77 34.77 68.48
10 93.6 81.00 38.45
Average 311.43 1843.09 108.389
 
